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Abstract 
 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA is in many ways a success. Millions more Americans now have 
access to health care, and the ACA catalyzed advances in health care delivery reform. 
Simultaneously, it has reinforced and bolstered a problem at the heart of American health policy 
and regulation: a love affair with choice. The ACA’s insurance reforms doubled down on the 
particularly American obsession with choice. This article describes three ways in which that 
doubling down is problematic for the future of US health policy. First, pragmatically, health 
policy theory predicts that choice among health plans will produce tangible benefits that it does 
not actually produce. Most people do not like choosing among health plan options, and many 
people—even if well educated and knowledgeable—do not make good choices. Second, creating 
the regulatory structures to support these choices built and reinforced a massive market 
bureaucracy. Finally, and most important, philosophically and sociologically the ACA reinforces 
the idea that the goal of health regulation should be to preserve choice, even when that choice is 
empty. This vicious cycle seems likely to persist, based on the Democratic debates leading up to 
the 2020 presidential election. 
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is in many ways a success. Millions more Americans now have 
access to health care, and it catalyzed advances in delivery reform. Simultaneously, the ACA has 
reinforced and bolstered a problem at the heart of American health policy and regulation: a love 
affair with choice. More specifically, the problem is sanctifying the idea that choice of health 
insurance plans is valuable. When it comes to some aspects of their health care, people may 
genuinely appreciate options and being able to make choices that leave them better off. Some 
people care about selecting a doctor they like and trust or who is convenient to their home or 
work. Many people care about reproductive choice. Most of us value the ability to decline care 
we don’t want. But very few people value choosing a health plan, in and of itself.  
The ACA’s insurance reforms doubled down on the particularly American obsession with 
choice. This article describes three ways in which that doubling down is problematic for the 
future of US health policy. First, pragmatically, health policy theory predicts that choice among 
health plans will produce tangible benefits that it does not in fact produce. Most people do not 
like choosing among health plan options, and many people—even if well educated and 
knowledgeable—do not make good choices. Second, creating the regulatory structures to support 
choices has built and reinforced a massive market bureaucracy, which I describe in detail 
elsewhere (Hoffman 2019b). Finally, and most important, philosophically and sociologically the 
ACA reinforces the idea that the goal of health regulation should be to preserve choice, even 
when that choice is empty. This vicious cycle seems likely to persist, based on the Democratic 
debates leading up to the 2020 presidential election.  
The Pragmatic Problem with Choice of Health Plan 
Mostly simply, the problem of choice of health plan is that it does not—and cannot— work in 
practice as anticipated in theory. The primary goal of the ACA was to reduce the number of 
uninsured and underinsured Americans through two main pathways: a Medicaid expansion and 
making individual (nongroup) health insurance more accessible and affordable.  
The policy design that motivated the latter—the expansion of the individual market—was 
modeled off of a similar reform in Massachusetts in 2006 and based loosely on the theory of 
managed competition, most often associated with Stanford economist Alain C. Enthoven (1978a, 
1978b, 1993). The oversimplified idea is that when consumers choose among health plans in a 
marketplace that is carefully regulated, they will make choices based on their preferences. Since 
most people will presumably choose plans where they get better care at lower costs, insurers will 
design and offer higher-value plans to compete for their business.  
Enthoven (1978b: 718) initially called the idea “Consumer-Choice Health Plan” and 
explained, “What distinguishes [this plan] from the others is that it seeks to give the consumer a 
choice from among alternative systems for organizing and financing care, and to allow him to 
benefit from his economizing choices.” For example, Enthoven (1978a: 652) stated that if people 
wanted a plan that prioritized better access to home health care or ambulatory care over, for 
example, hospitalization, they could choose it. 
Enthoven’s implicit assumption was that a tightly managed plan with an integrated 
delivery system, like a staff-model health maintenance organization, would prevail. He imagined 
plans where primary care providers would benefit financially if they reduced their patients’ 
excessive use of expensive specialty and inpatient care. If this reduction lowered plan spending 
but not quality, people would increasingly want these plans. Enthoven (1978b: 715) sought to 
mobilize choice in part to correct the thorny problems of overreliance on specialists and fee-for-
service medicine.  
Managed competition has influenced nearly every major health financing reform effort of 
the past decades. It graduated to the policy main stage in the early 1990s, when it was 
incorporated into the blueprint for President Clinton’s attempt at health reform, the Health 
Security Act (H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. [1993–94]). Although that reform failed, the idea lived on 
in the design of the Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage and Medicare Advantage, where 
Medicare beneficiaries can choose among plans administered by private health insurance 
companies.  
Most recently, managed competition emerged in the ACA’s health insurance exchanges, 
or Marketplace, where people could shop for plans. The ground rules for insurers were similar to 
what Enthoven (1978b: 713–14) described in his first blueprint, mandating that they accept any 
applicant during an open enrollment period (guaranteed issue), requiring “community-rated” 
premiums that do not vary based on health status, and placing limits on out-of-pocket spending. 
Like Enthoven’s vision, the ACA was designed with the idea that consumers’ choices would 
drive value in a managed, competitive insurance marketplace.  
The problem for the ACA, and with all of the versions of managed competition prior, is 
that it does not work as imagined. The reasons are many. The first problem is a flawed market, 
where choices do not resound as clearly as Enthoven envisioned. He imagined consumers’ 
signals to insurers would prompt insurers to transform health care financing and delivery. 
Although less true when Enthoven first wrote, providers have accreted substantial market power 
through consolidation, undermining insurers’ negotiating power.1 
The ACA, as designed, only exacerbates this power imbalance. Managed competition 
relies on having multiple insurers competing for customers, but the more insurers there are in the 
Marketplace, the less any one of them enrolls enough subscribers to gain bargaining power. 
Furthermore, the ACA’s exchanges reach a small slice of the population: initial best-case 
scenario estimates were about 24.7 million people enrolled by 2019 (CBO 2010). Actual annual 
enrollment to date is less than half that number (Kaiser Family Foundation 2019). With enrollees 
 
1 Vogt and Town (2006: 1, 6) document changes in concentration during the 1990s. 
Gaynor and Town (2012) report that hospital consolidation increased the price of hospital care 
and sometimes decreases quality. Dafny (2014: 198) states that “the last hospital-merger wave 
(in the 1990s) led to substantial price increases with little or no countervailing benefit.” 
divided among 50 states, insurers gain little leverage to negotiate with behemoth hospital 
systems. 
Even without faulty markets, the second major problem would be fatal: Enthoven’s 
idealized consumer, who chooses smartly among plans, does not—and will never—exist (Glied 
2007). This problem is multilayered. First, neoclassical economics assumes that consumers have 
well-ordered preferences, or “tastes,” that are genuinely aligned with their interests. Yet, people 
do not have exogenous preferences among systems of financing and organizing care. Most 
people have never experienced home health care or ambulatory care versus hospitalization. It is 
difficult to get a sense of willingness to pay for something that is intangible.  
Second, if people did have well-ordered preferences, most would struggle to translate 
them into plan choice. Most people do not understand the basic and defining features of health 
insurance plans, such as how much a plan costs and what benefits are covered (Garnick et al. 
1993: 206). In a survey of insured adults, only 14% correctly answered four simple multiple-
choice questions about cost-sharing features, such as a deductible, that are central to 
understanding the value of the plan (Loewenstein et al. 2013: 855). Yet, people overestimated 
their understanding, which suggests many would not seek help or education even if offered. 
Third, choosing a health plan requires making calculations regarding deductibles, cost 
sharing, premiums, and probability that exceed many Americans’ literacy and numeracy skills 
(Nelson et al. 2008; Peters and Levin 2008; Reyna et al. 2009: 945–46). Even college-educated 
Americans show surprisingly high levels of error on simple arithmetic tests (Nelson et al. 2008: 
263).  
Fourth, even without these fundamental problems, choosing health insurance has all of 
the telltale characteristics that impair rational decision making, sometimes referred to as 
cognitive biases. For example, people are overly optimistic about their own health (Weinstein 
1980), which could prompt them to underinvest in health insurance. People also struggle to 
factor risk into decision making, an element central, of course, to health insurance choices.2 This 
explains in part why young, healthy people may forgo buying health insurance, even when it’s 
cheap.  
Not surprisingly, a volume of empirical work documents that people, regardless of 
education, income, or smarts, routinely make poor choices among health plans. These poor 
choices persist even when options are simplified. And they persist even in the face of substantial 
choice architecture and simplification to improve decision making, which caused Bhargava and 
Loewenstein (2015: 2506)  to conclude that “the main barrier to financially efficient choice was 
not the number of options confronting employees, nor the transparency of their presentation, but 
rather the . . . lack of basic understanding of health insurance.” 
A few representative studies, among the many dozens documenting this unyielding 
failure, illustrate the problem. One study simulated the purchase of an ACA plan using only 
participants who passed a screening test for basic insurance literacy (Johnson et al. 2013). These 
more-literate-than-average subjects still selected the best choice only about half of the time. 
Wharton business school students got it wrong over one-quarter of the time. Short of defaulting 
people into the right option, choice architecture tools, like just-in-time calculators and tutorials, 
produced little improvement. 
 
2 Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 264) indicate that people make choices inconsistent with 
their own expected utility when navigating risky options. 
As another example, in the University of Michigan employee plan, over one-third of 
enrollees selected a plan that was identical to another option in every way except that it had a 
more restricted provider network (Sinaiko and Hirth 2011: 453). There was no scenario in which 
a worker would be better off enrolled in this plan, yet a large number of employees selected it. 
Another study of a large US firm found that most employees chose a worse option and, as a 
result, paid on average 24% more than they should have on premiums (Bhargava, Loewenstein, 
and Sydnor 2017: 1325). Lower-income employees were more likely to make a bad choice.  
Similar results occur in the Medicare market, where beneficiaries choose among private 
prescription drug plans. One study revealed that 73% of enrollees could have chosen a plan with 
lower premiums with no risk of spending more on prescription drugs during the year (Abaluck 
and Gruber 2011: 379). Another estimated that less than 10% of enrollees in Medicare drug plans 
choose their least-expensive option (Heiss et al. 2012). Once Medicare beneficiaries choose 
plans, they usually do not switch during subsequent open enrollment periods (Koma et al. 2019), 
even when they would be made better off by doing so (Afendulis, Sinaiko, and Frank 2017). 
People choose ACA plans that will cost them more in the long run (Avalere Health 2015; 
Fung et al. 2017). As many as one-third of people enroll in a plan with the lowest monthly 
premiums but that make them ineligible for significant cost-sharing reductions that would limit 
their out-of-pocket spending when they use care. Others choose health plans that are not aligned 
with their own stated medical needs and preferences. One simulation of an ACA exchange found 
that 40% of respondents chose a plan that would cost them at least $500 more than another 
option based on their self-reported health needs (Barnes, Hanoch, and Rice 2014: 67). In a 
different simulated study, only one-third of respondents chose the cost-minimizing plan, based 
on their own anticipated medical care need (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Benartzi 2017). Forty-
three percent of people overinsured, on average overspending by 24% or $1324 on premiums, 
and nearly a quarter underinsured. The authors estimated that if all people buying plans on the 
ACA exchanges had similar error rates as the study population, “the result would be roughly 
$7.1 billion of excess spending each year, borne by a population with low to moderate incomes” 
(10). 
Thus, managed competition, in practice, is not fostering meaningful choice or making 
people better off.  
The Bureaucratic Problem with Choice of Health Plan 
These choice-venerating policies, in turn, create larger institutional problems, what I call health 
care’s market bureaucracy (Hoffman 2019b). Markets do not exist in isolation (Vogel 2018). 
Regulations determine the bounds of competition (Marone 1994). Establishing these bounds for 
the ACA exchanges was a major lift, guided by no less than 100 pages of the ACA and 
Herculean regulatory efforts interpreting these pages. To set up and run the ACA exchanges, the 
federal government has spent tens of billions of dollars (Mach and Redhead 2014), and states 
have spent additional billions of dollars; California estimates annual costs of $350 million to run 
its exchange (Covered California 2018).  
When exchanges falter or ground rules change, updates have required armies of health 
regulators, reams of regulation, and seemingly endless evaluation and adjustment by technocratic 
experts (Hoffman 2019a). Under the Obama administration alone, the Department of Health and 
Human Services issued 24 new rules and 64 guidance documents on the exchanges,3 with 
parallel efforts in many states. The Trump administration continues apace, undoing much of 
what the Obama administration put in place. 
Even more, health care’s market bureaucracy amasses equally within the walls of private 
industry (McMaken 2015). The exchanges rely on private insurer participation, and their costs of 
operating, including high profits and salaries, is part of the cost of the market-based bureaucracy. 
It is unsurprising that the administrative costs of the US health care system well outpace those of 
its peers (Frakt 2018). 
Furthermore, the exchanges have commanded oversized technocratic analysis of their 
successes and shortcomings, consuming the time and energy of talented researchers and think 
tanks. Scholars, news outlets, and policy makers obsess over every twist and turn, from an 
insurer joining or dropping out to the ups and downs of premium prices. The New York Times 
alone published over 300 articles on the ACA exchanges from 2010 to 2016 (Hoffman 2019b). 
{Au: 2019 or in press?} 
The result is a market-lubricating regulatory scaffold—a bureaucracy perhaps larger than 
what a direct regulatory approach would produce, and equally vulnerable to capture, or perhaps 
even more so because, by definition, private industry holds the reins to success. Yet, this 
expensive tinkering provides insurance for a mere 3% of the population and sets them up to 
make poor plan choices.  
 
3 CMS n.d. counts listings under “Health Insurance Marketplaces” through calendar year 
2016. 
The ACA perpetuates health care’s market bureaucracy, yet it is only a small part of it. 
Managed competition has equally informed the design of the Medicare supplemental market, 
including Medicare Advantage, Medigap, and the Medicare Part D market. Beyond insurance, an 
equally futile market bureaucracy grew from consumer-driven approaches to medical care 
choices. There regulatory scaffolding supports policies attempting with little success to 
incentivize patients to make good choices to reduce their use of low-value care or to find lower-
priced providers (Hoffman 2019b). Likewise, modern antitrust regulation attempts, also with 
little success, to generate market dynamics that will drive higher-value health care. As antitrust 
expert Thomas Greaney (2009: 225) described, “Properly applied, antitrust law should promote 
decentralized decision-making by market participants while encouraging efficient combinations 
that serve consumer welfare.” These policies all privilege market choice and dynamics to achieve 
larger health policy goals. In turn, regulatory structures focus on scaffolding, lubricating, and 
repairing markets that in theory will enable people to choose what they value most, even though 
this theory repeatedly falls short in application. 
The ACA has continued to build the market bureaucracy. Although 20 million more 
Americans now have health insurance, about half through the exchanges, the ACA arguably 
paved a painful and expensive path to this end. 
The Sociological Problem with Choice of Health Plan 
The market bureaucracy, in turn, feeds a modern American obsession with choice. Pouring effort 
into regulatory structures aimed at bolstering choice perpetuates the idea that choice should be 
the ultimate goal.  
This veneration of choice as the American value has been building since at least the 
1960s. Early kernels in health care might be traced to reproductive and civil rights activists, and 
legal cases like Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 (381 U.S. 479, 483) and Roe v. Wade in 1973 
(410 U.S. 113, 170), which favored individual control through a language prohibiting 
government intrusion over individual reproductive choices. Choice defined the early disability 
rights movement and demands for independent living and self-direction instead of 
institutionalization (Administration for Community Living, n.d.). It echoes in works like Our 
Bodies Ourselves, published in 1970 by the Boston Women’s Health Collaborative, seeking to 
help women find self-empowerment over their bodies (Our Bodies, Our Selves, n.d.).  
In health care, the sanctification of choice is in part a reaction to a system in which what 
patients wanted long came second. For most of the twentieth century, doctors controlled medical 
care decisions. Then, central planning and managed care emerged to address high spending in the 
1970s and 1980s, and regulators and insurers gained decisional control. When those efforts fell 
short, consumer choice grew as something of a “sacred value” (Tetlock 2003). Informed consent 
evolved and aimed to put medical decisions back in the hands of patients. Market-based policies 
grew up in parallel, which elevated individual choice, defined by buying power. 
Yet, this veneration of choice has arguably gone too far. A world of increasing market 
choices is actively making people worse off (Schwartz 2004). Not only do people often make 
poor choices, but people also dread making choices. Thirty percent of respondents to one survey 
reported they would rather prepare their taxes than navigate health insurance (eHealthinsurance 
2008). The very existence of a market-based system can be contrary to what makes people, at 
least some people, feel better off. One study revealed that, although the idea of choice was 
associated with positive attributes for middle-class respondents, working-class respondents 
associated it with negative attributes and difficulty (Stephens, Fryberg, and Markus 2011).  
Choice can also obfuscate what people collectively value and impede productive policies. 
Studies show that activating the idea of choice can decrease support for policies promoting 
equality and societal benefits (Savani, Stephens, and Markus 2011). The ACA offers an 
illustration of this idea. Although it might have been otherwise (Hoffman 2011), the downfall of 
the ACA’s individual mandate came in part because it sought to achieve a collective goal 
through individual action. It prompted Americans to focus on their own bottom line—exactly 
how much an insurance policy cost and what it provided in return—instead of on the goal of 
universal access to health care. Choice centered the policy discussion in the wrong ideological 
place. The ACA’s health insurance reforms make this same mistake more broadly. They elevate 
the idea that choice of health plan is in and of itself an important goal. In turn, regulatory efforts 
futilely attempt to achieve this goal, without question.  
Yet, at the end of the day, most Americans do not care if their insurance comes from 
Aetna or Blue Cross. Many people do not know their own plan deductible—if they know what a 
deductible is—and many would struggle to weigh a choice between a plan with a $10 copay or 
10% coinsurance. Most people do, however, care about access to good doctors and hospitals. 
And Americans do care that they and others can get access to necessary health care without 
going broke. The most important collective goals may have very little to do with choice, and it 
will be necessary to move choice aside to understand this reality.  
The Post-ACA Horizon for Choice  
As the ACA turns 10, we can celebrate that it brought deep national attention to the goal of 
universal coverage, even if it has not yet achieved it. It also provides a moment to reflect on 
whether choice should remain the guiding light going forward. 
As candidates gear up for the 2020 election, they risk perpetuating the reverence of 
choice. Candidates who want to build on the ACA’s infrastructure sell choice, advocating for a 
public option for more choice. Perhaps most evident, Pete Buttigieg calls for “Medicare for all 
who want it.” He asserts that if Medicare is the best option, people will choose it, and it will 
slowly displace inferior private plans. Vice President Joe Biden calls for “giving Americans a 
new choice, a public health insurance option like Medicare.” (Biden for President 2019).  
Part of why these candidates sell choice is to differentiate themselves from advocates for 
a single-payer plan. Choice serves as a euphemistic promise to enfranchised Americans with 
gold-plated health insurance to let them keep their plans, as well as a balm to others who are 
loyal to their plans, whether their plans deserve such loyalty or not, or who are fearful of change. 
Candidates know and bank on the resonance of choice among voters—a resonance crafted 
through years of careful public-relations campaigns by opponents to single-payer health care 
(Potter 2020)—even among candidates who understand that choice is a largely empty promise. 
Proponents of Medicare for All also reinforce the centrality of choice, either by selling these 
plans based on choice of doctor, which Medicare for All would enhance for many people, or by 
crafting transition plans that look like opting into Medicare for All.  
Choice keeps its stronghold in part based on the narrative that what Americans want is 
too heterogeneous to be captured by any one solution. Yet, even at this moment when democracy 
limps along, democratic deliberation over health care priorities is vibrant, and sometimes reveals 
shared ground. Without overemphasizing the extent of such shared ground because Americans 
are clearly divided on many critical aspects of health policy, the places of shared commitments 
could suggest a basis for policy making priorities. For example, widespread outrage over 
exorbitant drug pricing and the bind in which it has put many American families is clear. 
Americans identified lowering drug prices as a top 2017 congressional priority (Council of 
Economic Advisers 2018). Likewise, in the summer of 2017, public outcry arose against the 
newly elected Republican Congress’s effort to repeal the ACA (Sessions, Cassidy, and Goodman 
2017), suggesting at least high-level support for greater access.  
The fight over Medicaid expansion reinforces this theme. The ACA intended to require 
states to expand Medicaid access to anyone earning up to 138% of the federal poverty level, but 
the ACA’s first major legal challenge, NFIB v. Sebelius, effectively made this expansion 
optional. As of September 2018, 34 states and the District of Columbia had expanded (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2018).  
In the more conservative opt-out states, voters have begun to directly override their 
representatives’ decision not to expand Medicaid in these states through ballot initiatives 
(Antoinisse and Rudowitz 2019). Maine passed a ballot initiative to expand Medicaid in 
November 2017 and voters in Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah followed in November 2018. These 
ballot initiatives suggest that voters value access to medical care in their communities, especially 
for lower-income community members. For these initiatives to pass required people who would 
not directly benefit personally to vote in favor. When the populace expresses shared 
commitments, whether in abstract terms like valuing access or concrete terms like lower drug 
prices, it is the job of elected representatives to overcome political barriers to respond. Yet, to the 
contrary and reflective of deep political dysfunction, legislatures and governors in Medicaid 
ballot-initiative states dig in their heels deeper to resist expansion, and Congress stalls out again 
and again on drug pricing reforms. We then turn futilely back to markets with hope that they will 
fix the things that our politicians are increasingly unable and unwilling to fix.  
Bureaucracy is inevitable, but it should bolster a health care system that can fulfill, rather 
than frustrate, what people and communities genuinely care about. Looking slightly under the 
surface suggests that what people really care most about is not always choice and that it is time 
to refocus health regulation on realizing other shared values.  
 
Allison K. Hoffman is professor of law at University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and 
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regulation affects conceptions of risk and responsibility.  
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